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Long-term interest rates tend to rise as monetary policymakers increase 
short-term interest rates. This relationship didn’t hold, however, during the recent 
U.S. monetary policy tightening cycle. Between June 2004 and June 2006, the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee increased the federal funds rate 17 times—going 
from 1 percent to 5.25 percent. Yet, long-term interest rates declined or stayed flat 
until early 2006.
This divergence between short- and long-term interest rates caught many 
economists, investors and central bankers by surprise. In his Feb. 16, 2005, con-
gressional testimony, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan charac-
terized the behavior of long-term interest rates since June 2004: “For the moment, 
the broadly unanticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum. 
Bond price movements may be a short-term aberration, but it will be some time 
before we are able to better judge the forces underlying recent experience.”
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This conundrum has 
prompted a great deal of 
discussion regarding both 
its magnitude and the 
factors behind it. However, 
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tinctly different pattern. During the 12 
months following the initial federal 
funds rate increase, this long-term 
bond yield declined by about 80 basis 
points as short-term rates rose rap-
idly. Based on past performance, the 
10-year bond yield seemed to be off 
track in mid-2005, possibly by 130 
basis points or more.
Such a decline appeared even 
more puzzling in light of other pres-
sures in the economy, such as a robust 
expansion, rising energy prices and a 
falling federal fiscal deficit. All had put 
upward pressure on long-term interest 
rates in the past.
Some analysts have suggested the 
conundrum occurred because the bond 
market expected very rapid federal 
funds rate increases at the beginning of 
the tightening. When the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) instead 
moved in 17 consecutive 25-basis-point 
steps, it surprised the market from the 
downside and bond yields were adjust-
ed downward to be consistent.
This explanation, however, 
contradicts the general impression 
that U.S. monetary policy’s transpar-
ency has improved considerably the 
past two decades. During the most 
recent monetary policy tightening, the 
FOMC’s actions were well anticipated. 
After the first increase, for example, 
the federal funds futures market and 
the Eurodollar futures market correctly 
anticipated almost every quarter-point 
increase in the federal funds rate for 
the next 12 to 18 months (Chart 2). 
Thus, it doesn’t seem plausible that the 
long-term interest rate declines that fol-
lowed the early-stage tightening arose 
from a misperception of monetary 
policy intention.
The Usual Suspects
In principle, bond yields can be 
divided into two components. One is 
the long-term real interest rate, which 
consists of an expected future real 
interest rate, plus a risk premium to 
cover the uncertainties of its future 
changes. The other is an inflation 
component, which depends on the 
Since then, this conundrum has 
prompted a great deal of discussion 
regarding both its magnitude and the 
factors behind it. However, a compel-
ling and broadly accepted explanation 
has yet to be reached. 
The correct understanding and 
quantification of the conundrum have 
direct implications for monetary policy, 
which largely impacts economies as 
long-term interest rates respond to 
changes in central banks’ target rates. 
Persistent changes in the relationship 
between short- and long-term interest 
rates will affect the timing and impact 
of monetary policy actions.
The Conundrum Period
During the previous three mone-
tary policy tightening cycles—1988–89, 
1994–95 and 1999–2000—the 10-year 
Treasury yield responded to increases 
in the federal funds rate target by ris-
ing an average 26 basis points for 
every 100-basis-point increase in the 
target (Chart 1). 
In the tightening episode that 
started June 30, 2004, however, the 
10-year Treasury yield showed a dis-
Chart 1









’07 ’06 ’05 ’04 ’03 ’02 ’01 ’00 ’99 ’98 ’97 ’96 ’95 ’94 ’93 ’92 ’91 ’90 ’89 ’88 ’87 ’86
Federal funds rate target
10-year Treasury rate
SOURCE: Haver Analytics.




to be off track   
in mid-2005, 
possibly by 130 
 basis points or more.  EconomicLetter  FedeRAL ReSeRve BAnk OF dALLAS   FedeRAL ReSeRve BAnk OF dALLAS  EconomicLetter 3
expected future inflation rate, plus a 
premium compensating investors for 
the uncertainties of future inflation. 
Changes in long-term bond yields 
should reflect variations in long-term 
real interest rates, long-run inflation 
expectations or risk premiums.1
With this in mind, it’s worthwhile 
to review some changes in the econ-
omy and financial markets that might 
be relevant to the conundrum. In par-
ticular, market participants have cited 
the following factors as lowering risk 
premiums, putting downward pressure 
on long-term interest rates.
Foreign official purchases. 
Many market participants have sug-
gested that substantial increases in 
foreign official purchases of U.S. 
Treasury securities in recent years 
have substantially depressed long-term 
Treasury yields.2 In particular, Asian 
central banks built up their holdings 
of foreign reserves and kept their cur-
rency values low relative to the dollar 
to boost exports to the U.S.
Faced with a rapid accumula-
tion of dollar assets from record-high 
trade surpluses, Asian central banks 
invested many of these reserves in U.S. 
Treasury bonds, exerting downward 
pressure on Treasury yields (Chart 3). 
Some economists estimate such pres-
sures on the 10-year Treasury yield at 
40 to 120 basis points.
More generally, a global savings 
glut has arisen from surges in revenues 
for oil and commodity exporters, the 
rapid income growth of high-saving 
East Asian households and the reduc-
tion in fiscal deficits by several Latin 
American countries. These develop-
ments have added to the net supply 
of loanable funds to increasingly open 
world financial markets, helping hold 
down long-term interest rates in the 
U.S. and other advanced nations. 
 Increased demand by pen-
sion funds. Some analysts argue that 
declining bond yields may partly owe 
to higher demand for longer-duration 
Treasury securities as a result of pro-
posed corporate pension reforms.
In particular, U.S. pension funds 
might be required to match the maturi-
ties of their assets and liabilities. This 
concern may have encouraged them 
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Chart 3
Foreign Official Purchases and 10-Year Treasury Yield
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duration Treasuries ahead of any regu-
latory changes, suppressing long-term 
Treasury yields. Some analysts also 
cite U.K. pension reforms, which have 
been associated with unusually low 
yields on British bonds.
Decreased macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Because long-term bond 
yields are closely related to short-term 
interest rates and other macroeco-
nomic fundamentals (both present and 
expected), declines in macroeconomic 
uncertainty since the early 1980s may 
have put downward pressure on long-
term interest rates.
The Great Moderation of the 
American business cycle, as described 
by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, has 
been linked to decreased uncertainty 
about inflation, real growth and real 
interest rates.
Declines in asset price volatil-
ity. The deepening global integration 
of financial markets, coupled with the 
introduction of new financial instru-
ments the past two decades, may have 
played a role in reducing the magni-
tude of economic fluctuations and miti-
gating their effect on long-term inves-
tors. Consequently, less-volatile asset 
prices—in this case, Treasury bond 
prices—have ostensibly worked to 
lower risk premiums and bond yields.
A Macro–Finance Analysis 
Determining the impact of these 
factors on the conundrum requires a 
rigorous framework. Given the vari-
ous forces at work, a joint macroeco-
nomic and finance analysis is the most 
desirable.
A macroeconomic perspective 
calls for an examination of the rela-
tionship between current and future 
economic fundamentals and the Fed’s 
monetary policy. It recognizes that 
long-term interest rate movements 
reflect markets’ expectations of the 
future federal funds rate, which the 
Fed adjusts to achieve its inflation and 
economic stabilization goals. 
A finance perspective entails 
quantifying changing investor percep-
tions of risks for bond pricing, both 
in the amount of interest rate risks 
and changes in the pricing of those 
risks. It recognizes that reductions in 
risk premiums are likely a part of the 
conundrum. 
In a 2006 article, Glenn Rude-
busch, Eric Swanson and Tao Wu 
provide a good example of such 
a macro–finance approach.3 The 
analysis is based on two different 
models. The first is a vector autore-
gression-based model developed by 
Bernanke, Vincent Reinhart and Brian 
Sack (BRS) in 2004.4 The second is 
a New Keynesian-based model that 
Rudebusch and Wu (RW) developed 
about the same time.5
Both models incorporate impor-
tant linkages between interest rates 
and macroeconomic fundamentals. 
They also impose the standard no-
arbitrage restriction from financial 
analysis to model the variations of 
term premiums across all bond maturi-
ties and over time. However, these 
models have technical specifications 
that differ in important ways, such as 
the short-run effect on interest rates 
and the economy. Analysis drawing 
from both may very well yield more 
robust explanations for the conun-
drum and other aspects of interest rate 
behavior.
Both models account for the gen-
erally downward trend in the 10-year 
bond yield over the past two decades 
(Charts 4A, B). The risk-neutral com-
ponent—the sum of long-run inflation 
expectations and the expected real 
interest rate—falls considerably over 
the same period. So does the associ-
ated risk premium in BRS. This is 
consistent with the Great Moderation 
interpretation that the U.S. economy 
has become much less volatile and 
inflation has gradually stabilized at 
low levels.  
Nevertheless, the estimations also 
yield notable prediction errors in the 
most recent monetary tightening cycle 
(Charts 5A, B). Both models overpre-
dicted the 10-year Treasury yield by 50 
to 75 basis points in the second half of 
2004 and almost all of 2005. 
Foreign official purchases 
of U.S. Treasury   
securities, increased
demand for Treasury   
securities by pension 
funds, decreased   
macroeconomic   
uncertainty and   
declines in asset   
price volatility are   
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The models failed to closely track 
the 10-year bond yield on a few other 
occasions as well—in 1997–99, for 
instance. But the prediction errors in 
2004–05 are substantially larger and 
much more persistent than in previous 
episodes. 
In other words, both macro–
finance models find evidence of a 
substantial and persistent conundrum 
in long-term bond yields in 2004 and 
2005 that can’t be accounted for by 
changes in macroeconomic fundamen-
tals and estimated declines in risk pre-
miums implied by such changes. Yet, 
the magnitude of the conundrum is 
much smaller than what a simple cor-
relation analysis would suggest.
Chart 4
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Both macro–finance models focus 
only on macroeconomic fundamentals 
and their associated risk premiums; 
they don’t examine special factors that 
might have affected the premiums. A 
natural next step involves determining 
market volatility: the implied volatil-
ity in the longer-term U.S. Treasury 
market from the Merrill Lynch MOVE 
index; the implied volatility from 
Eurodollar options for uncertainty 
about the near-term path of monetary 
policy; and the VIX measure of implied 
volatility from S&P 500 index options 
for uncertainty in the stock market.
• Two measures of macroeco-
nomic volatility: an eight-quarter trail-
ing standard deviation of the real gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate 
to proxy output uncertainty and a  
24-month trailing standard deviation  
of core personal consumption expen-
diture (PCE) deflator inflation to proxy 
inflation uncertainty.
• A measure of foreign govern-
ment and central bank purchases of 
U.S. Treasury securities: the 12-month 
change in custodial holdings by the 
New York Fed for all foreign official 
institutions, normalized by the total 
stock of U.S. Treasury debt held by the 
public.
All these series are natural candi-
dates for omitted variables that could 
affect long-term bond yields. For 
instance, less volatility in the longer-
term Treasury market tends to make 
Treasury securities more attractive rela-
tive to other assets and drive long-term 
bond yields down. Similarly, reduced 
uncertainty about future monetary 
policy tends to lower the risks of hold-
ing long-term bonds and lead to lower 
risk premiums.
Another possibility is that an 
increase in stock market volatility 
enhances the safety appeal of Treasury 
bonds, driving their prices up and their 
yields down. Lower macroeconomic 
volatility and increased foreign pur-
chases of U.S. Treasuries also depress 
the term premium and lower long-term 
bond yields.
Statistical analysis reveals how 
these factors differ in their effect on 
long-term bond yields (Table 1). The 
most significant factor is the large 
drop in the implied volatility of lon-
ger-term Treasury securities, with a 
1 point decline in the index reducing 
which of those factors could have con-
tributed to the conundrum in 2004–05. 
To this end, Rudebusch, Swanson 
and Wu sought to quantify those fac-
tors by examining:
• Three measures of financial 
Chart 5
Models Overpredict 10-Year Treasury Yield  






NOTE: Charts depict variations in bond yields not explained by the models.
SOURCE: Author’s estimates.
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the 10-year Treasury yield by 0.5 to 
1.2 basis points.
Increases in stock market vola-
tility also tend to reduce long-term 
Treasury yields, although such effects 
aren’t always statistically significant. 
Less uncertainty about real growth and 
inflation—in particular, uncertainty 
about inflation—significantly decreases 
long-term Treasury yields.
Interestingly, foreign official pur-
chases of U.S. Treasuries—the most 
important factor many market partici-
pants and the financial press cited for 
keeping long-term bond yields low 
during the conundrum period—don’t 
have a significant effect on long-term 
Treasury yields.
Even the coefficient estimate’s sign 
is “wrong.” The press had conjectured 
a negative correlation between for-
eign official purchases and long-term 
Treasury yields, but the data indicate a 
positive relationship. 
To add to the confusion, the rela-
tionship between foreign official pur-
chases and Treasury yields hasn’t been 
consistent over the past two decades. 
Controlling for macroeconomic deter-
minants of long-term bond yields 
reveals that the correlation is signifi-
cantly positive between 1987 and 2000 
and negative only since 2002.6
Dissecting the Conundrum
How much of the conundrum 
can these factors explain? One way 
to answer this question is to break 
down the regression results from the 
declines in 10-year Treasury yields. 
Focusing on the 12 months following 
the initial monetary tightening in June 
2004 isolates the period when the 
conundrum was most apparent.
The actual decline in 10-year 
Treasury yields over those 12 months 
is approximately 90 basis points 
(Table 2).7 Both models suggest that a 
substantial part of it stems from model-
implied term premiums. The RW 
model also identifies a decline in the 
risk-neutral component of the 10-year 
rate, primarily reflecting a decline in 
long-run inflation expectations. 
However, a large portion of the 
bond-yield declines remains unex-
plained by macroeconomic funda-
mentals and associated risk premiums. 
Changes in the model residuals are 
nearly 87 basis points in the BRS 
model and 32 basis points in the RW 
model.
These residuals can be decom-
posed using six measures of volatil-
ity and foreign purchases. The fall 
in implied volatility of longer-term 
Treasuries accounts for the greatest 
fraction of the conundrum, or more 
than a third of the unexplained residu-
als from both models. Declines in the 
uncertainty of real GDP growth also 
contribute to the conundrum, account-
ing for about 10 percent of the model 
residuals. 
Inflation volatility doesn’t change 
substantially in those 12 months and 
has essentially no effect. The three 
remaining factors aren’t statistically 
significant and account for relatively 
small changes in bond yields during 
the period. 
Half or more of the model 
residuals—49 basis points in the BRS 
model and 23 basis points in the RW 
model—remain unexplained after the 
six variables are taken into account. 
These may be related to such factors 
as pension fund reforms or abnormal 
changes in risk appetites that aren’t 
considered in the analysis.
Despite its incomplete results, the 
macro–finance approach provides a 
useful perspective for disentangling the 
conundrum.
Two models identify a bond-yield 
conundrum during the most recent 
monetary tightening cycle, albeit a 
smaller one than was presented by 
the financial press. The conundrum is 
heavily related to a substantial decline 
in the volatility of long-term bond pric-
es. Contrary to many accounts, foreign 
Table 1
Regressions of Model Residuals
            Bernanke–Reinhart–Sack         Rudebusch–Wu
Independent variable           Coefficient           (t stat)       Coefficient   (t stat)
Implied volatility on longer-term Treasury 
  securities (Merrill Lynch MOVE index)   1.20  (5.47)  .49  (4.11)
Implied volatility on six-month-ahead 
  Eurodollar futures (from options, in  
  basis points)  –.23  (–1.35)  –.17  (–1.83)
Implied volatility on S&P 500 
  (VIX index)  –.33  (–.63)  –.50  (–1.73)
Realized volatility of quarterly GDP growth
  (trailing 8-quarter standard deviation, 
  in percent)  15.40  (3.10)  3.90  (1.45)
Realized volatility of monthly core PCE 
  price inflation (trailing 24-month  
  standard deviation, in percent)  360.00  (2.18)  214.00  (2.39)
Foreign official purchases of U.S. Treasury  
  securities (trailing 12-month total,  
  as percent of U.S. debt in hands of public)  147.00  (.76)  38.00  (.04)
R2  .30    .14
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Table 2
Decomposition of Long-Term Bond-Yield Conundrum
                    Bernanke–Reinhart–    Rudebusch– 
Independent variable                               Sack model        Wu model
Observed change in 10-year yield (basis points), 
June ’04–June ’05, of which:    –93.3  –87.0
   • Model-implied change in risk-neutral 10-year yield    13.1  –29.6
   • Model-implied change in term premium    –19.9  –25.2
   • Change in model residuals, of which:    –86.5  –32.2
      Change in implied volatility on longer-term Treasuries  –29.9  –12.2
      Change in realized volatility of core PCE inflation    1.1  .7
      Change in realized volatility of GDP growth    –11.6  –2.9
      Change in implied volatility of Eurodollar rate    7.0  5.1
      Change in implied volatility of S&P 500    1.2  1.7
      Change in foreign official purchases    –6.0  –1.6
      Unexplained by above    –48.6  –23.0
SOURCE: Author’s construction.
official purchases of Treasury securities 
apparently play little or no role.
The bond-yield conundrum—fall-
ing long-term interest rates in the midst 
of monetary tightening—posed chal-
lenges to the Fed’s monetary policy 
actions in 2004 and 2005. Will the 
opposite of the bond-yield conundrum 
occur now, with the Fed cutting the 
federal funds rate at a time of uncer-
tainty about rising energy and food 
prices and long-run inflation stability? 
This question increases the importance 
of closely monitoring the relationship 
between long- and short-term rates.
Wu is a senior economist in the 
Research Department of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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